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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the presentation of a story grammar approach to
comprehension. The development of a grammar represents an attempt to
describe the higher order cognitive structures which are used to encode,
represent, and retrieve information from stories such as folktales or fables.
These structures, defined as a set of rewrite rules, specify the types of
information which should occur in stories and the types of logical relations
which should connect story components. They guide a listener or reader in
determining when information, critical to the cohesiveness of a story, has
been omitted from a text or when the logical organization of a story has
deviated from the expected sequence of events. Predictions about story
memory have been derived from the story grammar and tested in several
different studies on story memory. The results of these studies have shown
the validity of using a story grammar approach to comprehension. However,
some of the results can not readily be explained by the rules included in the
current grammars. A discussion of these contradictions and future
developments necessary for a more comprehensive view of understanding are
provided in the conclusion of the paper.
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Introduction
In the past few years, a productive area of investigation has concerned
the process by which children comprehend complex linguistic information, such
as a story. Because stories are an integral part of the school curriculum
and are told frequently in everyday social interactions, teachers and
psychologists have raised questions about those procedures which would ensure
a high rate of comprehension for all children. Other important questions to
be answered concern methods for evaluating whether comprehension has occurred
and training techniques to be used when children fail to understand stories.
The goals of this chapter are: to discuss these issues, to provide a review
of previous research on children's comprehension of stories, and to give an
overview of the field.
A close examination of the linguistic and anthropological literature
(Colby & Cole, 1973; Greimas, 1971; Levi-Strauss, 1955; Prince, 1973; Propp,
1958) illustrates that the study of stories has been a major concern for some
time. Because stories often contain information relating to the moral
codes, values, and social customs of a society (Levi-Strauss, 1955), they
served as an excellent source for an examination of the similarities and
differences among cultures with respect to these dimensions. In an attempt
to investigate the commonalities across different stories, several complex
analyses of both story content and structure have been done (Bremmond, 1973;
Greimas, 1971; Levi-Strauss, 1955; Prince, 1973; Propp, 1958). Although
different in many respects, all lead to similar conclusions regarding the
structure of a story. Despite the variation in the semantic content of
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stories, these analyses document the existence of stable organizational
patterns regarding the types of information included in stories and the
loyical relations among the parts of a story. Some analyses (Brernond, 1969;
Levi-Strauss, 1955) also il lustrate how the specific content of stories can
be classified into stable, consistent patterns.
In order to substantiate further the claim that a structural prototype
for a story exists, Todorov (1969) provided anecdotal evidence that children
and adults could easily identify the types of prose which conform to and
violate the structure of a story. Todorov also argued that when presented
with narratives that do not conform to the specific requirements of a story,
listeners will transform, add, or delete information so that the resulting
story does conform more to the prototypical structure of a story. Thus, a
major implication derived from this study is that a listener has some prior
knowledge about the structure of a story, and that this knowledge plays a
critical role in determining how a story will be retold as well as
determining what types of prose will be classified as stories.
There are two components, however, that are absent from these analyses
of story structures. First, none of the descriptions states exactly how
pre-existing knowledge of stories influences the comprehension process and
second, none of the studies clearly specifies whether the structure of a
story lies in the head of a listener or in the text of a story.
In contrast to the linguistic and anthropological studies, a review of
the early psychological literature on stories has shown a primary concern
with how prior knowledge of stories interacts with memory and comprehension,
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but only a general interest in the structural characteristics of a story.
Until recently, the sole investigator of the cognitive processes and
structures involved in story understanding was Bartlett (1932).
In describing how subjects remembered stories, he came to certain
conclusions. Bartlett found that people rarely recalled stories exactly as
they heard them. Instead, he observed that transformations of the
information often occurred, with new information being added, and some of the
original story information being deleted. From these results, he concluded
that story memory was not only a function of the organization of incoming
information, but was dependent upon the mental operations and cognitive
structures already acquired by the listener. He called these structures
"schemata," and, his elaboration of the concept of schemata, original ly used
by Kant and Binet (Anderson, in press; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976), became one
of Bartlett's lasting contributions to the study of psychology. His notion
of a schema has strongly and directly influenced recent psychological
investigations of story comprehension, as well as studies in other areas of
cognition.
To Bartlett, a mental schema represented "an active organization of past
reactions and experiences which are always operating in any wel l-developed
organism" (Bartlett, 1932). He emphasized the reciprocal interaction between
incoming new information and existing mental structures by stating that
incoming information is actively integrated into a subject's mental
structure, but at the same time, the presence of new information modifies the
old structures. If the same type of information occurs repeatedly, new
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structures will emerge from the old and will enable the listener to encode
the "new" information more quickly. Bartlett recognized the variability in
the process of recalling stories. Although he believed schemata to be stable
and shared by individuals within a given culture, he argued that differences
in attitudes, interests, affective and cognitive states could also produce
differences, and therefore variability, in these structures.
Bartlett made several predictions regarding the interaction between
incoming information and prior knowledge structures during comprehension.
For example, he stated that when the text structure of a story violated or
aid not conform to the underlying cognitive structures, story recal I would
conform more to the prototypical or expected structure than to the actual
text structure. However, one cannot predict the type of transformations that
would occur in story recal I, since Bartlett did not describe further the
specific nature of a story schema.
If the process of story comprehension is to be studied systematically, a
detailed description of a story schema appears to be necessary. Although
several linguistic studies provide detailed analyses of story structures,
these descriptions were constructed by analyzing the text structure of many
stories. In spite of the commonalities that may exist between the text and
underlying cognitive structures used to guide the representation of story
material, there is no guarantee that an isomorphic relationship exists
between the two. The demands on working memory and the types of strategies
used during story encoding and retrieval may limit the types of text
structures which can be comprehended with a high degree of accuracy. It is
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necessary to formulate a description of the underlying representation of
stories, and then to analyze the comprehension of different types of text.
The Development of Story Grammars
Based upon Bartlett's (1932) initial work on story memory and Propp's
(1958) morphology of the folktale, Rumelhart (1975) developed a story grammar
which describes the underlying cognitive structures used to encode,
represent, and retrieve story information. Because Rumelhart's grammar was
difficult to use in the analysis of many different stories, several
investigators (Glenn & Stein, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn,
1977a; Thorndyke, 1977) modified his grammar so that the underlying
representation of a wider variety of stories could be described. These
grammars differ from the linguistic study of stories, not only because they
emphasize the psychological structures guiding the comprehension process, but
also because a set of specific predictions concerning the quality of
comprehension can be derived from them.
In order to facilitate an understanding of a story grammar approach,
this section will outline the basic assumptions underlying the construction
of a grammar, and then i l lustrate how a listener attempts to break down a
simple story into its component parts. The Stein and Glenn (1977a) grammar
will be used for illustrative purposes. However, in discussing studies
completed on story comprehension in children, an attempt will be made to
integrate the findings from all grammatical approaches, especially those of
Mandler and Johnson (1977).
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The Stein and Glenn (1977a) grammar assumes that some type of schematic
representation of stories is used to guide encoding and retrieval of incoming
story information. These schemata may be acquired in two ways: through .
hearing or reading a variety of different stories and by the acquisition of
knowledge regarding human social interactions. The latter source of
information is important for story comprehension, since stories are simi lar
to the content and structure of social perceptions and human action
sequences.
One of the assumed functions of story schemata is to guide a listener or
reader in breaking down story information into its component parts. This
occurs because the schema specifies the types of information which should
occur in a story and the types of logical relations which should link the
components of a story. Thus, a story schema guides the listener in
determining what parts of the story have not been included and in determining
when a story has deviated from the normal temporal sequence of events. One
implication is that when the text structure violates the expected story
sequence, the resulting representation wil I tend to correspond more to the
expected story sequence than to the original text sequence.
A story schema may be defined as a set of rewrite rules containing
knowledge about the generic structure of stories. It is assumed that
although there are individual differences in acquired story knowledge, some
common type of schematic representation is acquired by all who listen to and
tell stories. The development of story grammars illustrates an attempt to
describe the general structural characteristics of stories.
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Story Analysis: The Single Episode Story
The primary unit of analysis in a story is a category, and several
categories occur within a story structure. Each category refers to a
specific type of information, and serves a different function in the story.
Normally, each sentence in a story can be classified into a particular
category. However, the sentence is not the critical variable defining how
information is classified into categories. There are instances in which the
initial part of a sentence belongs to one category, and the latter part
belongs to a second category, depending upon the functional role each portion
plays in the story.
A story structure can be described in terms of a tree diagram which is
an hierarchical network of story categories and the logical relationships
which connect them. (For a detailed description of these structures, see
Glenn & Stein, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; or Stein & Glenn, 1977a.) In
order to illustrate how stories are represented, a brief example of the story
analysis process is presented. Table 1 lists a description of each of the
categories included in a simple story structure and provides an example of
how statements in a specific story, "Albert Gets Caught" are broken down into
different categories.
Insert Table 1 about here
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The initial division of a simple story consists of two parts: a setting
plus an episode structure. The setting begins the story with the
introduction of a protagonist and normally includes information about the
social, physical, or temporal context pertaining to the remainder of the
story. The setting is not part of the episode, as it is not directly related
to the subsequent behavioral sequence described in the episode. However,
information in the setting category may constrain the possible types of
behavioral sequences which then occur.
The remainder of the story consists of an episode, the primary higher
order unit of analysis. A sequence of five categories is included in the
episode: initiating event, internal response, attempt, consequence, and
reaction. The initiating event category contains some type of event or
action which marks a change in the story environment. Its major function is
to evoke the formation of a goal. The goal is included in the internal
response category. Internal responses not only include goals, but also
include affective states and cognitions, and serve to motivate a character's
subsequent overt behavior. Actions referring to overt, yoal-directed
behavior are defined as attempts. A character's attempts then result in the
consequence which marks the attainment or non-attainment of the goal. The
final category is the reaction, which includes a character's response to the
consequence or broader consequences caused by the goal attainment. It is
apparent that each category in the episode logically follows the preceding
one. Furthermore, according to the grammar, these categories always occur in
a specific temporal sequence.
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Several factors signal the ending of one category and the beginning of
the next. Temporal markers such as: One day, Suddenly, Finally, etc.,
facilitate the analysis of a story into its components. However, the
semantic content of a statement and the logical relationships among story
statements are equally important in determining the classification of story
statements into different categories in an episode.
In describing the structural characteristics of an episode, the
distinction between the text structure versus the underlying cognitive
structure of an episode is critical. There are many stories that have one or
two categories in an episode deleted from the text structure. For example,
internal responses and reactions are frequently omitted. At times the text
structure of an episode begins with the character's internal response and
does not include an initiating event. However, it is assumed that although
these categories are omitted from the text structure, they are inferred
during the encoding process, and are represented in the underlying cognitive
structure.
Some episodes in the text omit more than one or two of these categories.
In these cases, an episode is considered to be incomplete, since there are
three basic requirements which must be met in order for a category sequence
to be considered a complete episode. The sequence must contain: (1) some
reference to the motivation or purpose of the character's behavior; (2) an
overt goal-directed action; and (3) the attainment or non-attainment of the
goal. Therefore the categories which must be included in an episode are:
(1) the initiating event which signals the reason for the formation of a goal
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or an internal response which normally includes the goal; (2) an overt
action, signified by the attempt category; and (3) a direct consequence,
marking the attainment or non-attainment of the goal.
Multiple Episode Stories
If one examines many different folktales and fables, it is evident that
few stories are represented as simply as the structure just described. Most
stories contain several episodes, and the individual story can vary, not only
in the number of episodes contained in a story structure, but also in regard
to the types of logical relations which connect the various episodes. Both
the Stein and Glenn (1977a) and the Mandler and Johnson (1977) grammars
describe the different type of inter-episodic complexities that occur in
stories and provide several analyses of more complex stories. For the
purposes of this paper, however, only the types of relations which connect
episodes in these multiple episode stories wi I I be discussed.
Any two episodes in a story structure can be connected by one of three
relationships: AND, THEN, and CAUSE. The most common relations connecting
episodes are THEN and CAUSE. The THEN relation is used when one episode
follows a second, where the first episode sets up the necessary preconditions
for the second episode to occur; however, the occurrence of the first episode
does not directly cause the second to occur. An example of the THEN relation
is found in the classic folktale, "Goldi locks and the Three Bears." When
Goldi locks enters the bears' home, two episodes occur in succession. The
first episode recounts Goldilocks' discovery of the porridge, her desire to
eat it, and the act of finishing the baby bear's portion. The second episode
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describes her becoming fatigued, the discovery of the chairs, and her action
sequence of trying out all of the chairs so that she might rest. In this
story, the first episode does not directly cause her behavior in the second
sequence, as she might have chosen another course of action after eating.
However, the events in the first episode do set up the necessary
preconditions for her goal and attempts in the second episode.
The second type of connection, the CAUSE relation, implies a direct
connection between two episodes such that the first episode directly ensures
the occurrence of the second episode. Certain problems arise in deciding
whether episodes are connected by the THEN or CAUSE relation because the
perception of a direct causal link is dependent upon the prior knowledge
acquired about the events in a story. If more than one alternative episode
can be generated after the occurrence of the first episode, the most accurate
connection between the two episodes would be a THEN relation. However, if
the subject perceives that only one type of episode could result as a
function of a previous episode, then the connection between the two episodes
is a CAUSE relation. Therefore, the types of relations connecting two
episodes are strictly dependent upon the inferences made by a subject during
the process of organizing story information, either at the time of encoding
the information or during the process of reorganizing story information once
encoding has occurred.
The third type of relation connecting two episodes is the AND relation.
This type of relation describes a story sequence where two episodes occur in
a temporal sequence according to the story time but where the episodes may
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have occurred in any order, or may have occurred simultaneously in real
time. For example, many stories relate how two characters desire to pursue
the same goal, e.g., two knights who want the hand of a beautiful princess.
In the beginning of the story, a description containing two episodes may be
given explaining why each knight desired the hand of the princess, or how
each knight formulated his current goal. These episodes occur in a sequence
in the story line, but there is no a priori reason to believe that one
episode occurred before another. In fact, many of the rhetorical markers in
the story--e.g. meanwhile, at the same time, etc., directly cause the reader
to infer that the two episodes were occurring simultaneously. After the two
episodes occur, each of them is usually related to a third episode by a THEN
or CAUSE relation.
Research on Story Comprehension
The following section is devoted to the discussion of several studies
which have attempted to validate a story grammar approach to comprehension.
Temporal Organization of Stories
From the previous discussion of story grammars, it is apparent that the
temporal sequence of category information and the logical relations
connecting categories are essential to the definition of an episode. In
order to validate the rewrite rules defining a story schema, predictions can
be made about those story texts which either correspond to or violate the
expected sequence in a story. Specific hypotheses and the results from
several studies are presented in the following section.
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If a story sequence corresponds to the expected sequence, there should
be little or no difficulty recalling the temporal order of events given in
the text of a story. Data from two recent studies (Mandler & Johnson, 1977;
Stein & Glenn, 1977a) support this prediction by showing that children as
young as six years make very few errors in recalling the correct temporal
order of stories corresponding to the expected sequence. Recall data
collected from four and five year-old children (Stein & Garfin, 1977) show
that even pre-school children experienced little difficulty ordering the
events in a story, provided the story corresponded to the expected sequence.
These results are important because they contradict Piaget's (1960) findings
of poorly organized story recall in six to eight year-old children. The
differences between these two sets of results appear to be a function of
story complexity, characterized by both the syntactic structure of sentences
and the type of logical relations connecting sentences.
Brown (1975) has also completed a series of studies on children's memory
for logically organized sequences. She found that when preschool children
were asked to reconstruct a series of logically related pictures, very few
errors occurred. However, like Piaget, she found that many preschool
children had difficulty recalling the exact order of picture sequences.
The fact that Brown's recall data conform more to Piaget's data than to
the results found in the studies by Mandler and Johnson (1977), Stein and
Garfin (1977), and Stein and Glenn (1977a) shows the importance of the type
of stories used as stimulus materials. In the Stein and Garfin (1977) study,
the content of the stories used as stimuli was taken from a group of stories
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told by four and five year old children. The stimuli were also constructed
to correspond, in every way, to the expected story sequence. Although
Brown's picture sequences had an underlying logical coherence, it may be that
the picture sequences did not correspond identically to the structure of an
expected sequence. Certain categories might also have been missing, and four
and five year-olds may not have been able to make the appropriate inferences
to fill in the "gaps," leading to a semantically cohesive representation in
memory. The high accuracy of reconstruction memory in Brown's study,
however, appears to contradict this argument. At present, it is unclear why
young children have difficulty with some story sequences and not others.
However, the results from the story grammar studies strongly suggest that
children as young as four have little difficulty with "well-formed" stories
(i.e., those corresponding to the expected story sequence), suggesting that
by this age, a story schema similar to the one proposed in the story grammars
is used to guide story processing. A more direct test of young children's
internal representation of stories may shed light on these issues.-."..&-
If children have acquired story schemata as described by the grammars,
then their spontaneous organization of story material should correspond to
the expected story sequence. Furthermore, if children are presented with
stories that contain any deviation from the expected sequence, then some type
of reorganization of the incoming information should occur so that story
recall conforms more to the expected sequence than to the structure in a
given text.
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In a study conducted by Stein and Glenn (1978) seven and eleven year-old
children were given twelve sentences from a well-formed story, simi lar to the
one presented in Table 1. All children were asked to make a "good" story,
similar to stories they would either tell a friend or find in a storybook.
Each child constructed three separate stories. The results from both age
groups showed a significant positive correlation when the constructed orders
were compared to the order proposed in the Stein and Glenn (1977a) grammar.
However, the results also showed that many of the constructed stories did not
identically correspond to the expected sequences. This was particularly true
for the younger children. The mean correlations between the constructed and
expected story sequences were .44 for seven year-olds and .77 for eleven
year-olds.
Two types of errors accounted for the majority of variance found in this
task: (1) children constructed stories where statements in the internal
response category were placed in positions other than the ones specified in
the expected sequence; and (2) children placed consequence and reaction
statements in positions other than the predicted order. In most cases, the
repositioning of the internal response statements did not disrupt the logical
sequence of story events. If the story in Table 1 is used as an example, it
can be seen that repositioning statements 5 and 6 so that they occur after
statement 7 results in a logical story. Statements 6 and 7 may also be
inverted and a semantically coherent story remains. Simi larly, the types of
errors made in reordering consequence and reaction statements resulted in
semantically cohesive stories.
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Rather than indicating that young children have not acquired a
consistent prototypical story schema, some of the errors indicate the
problems associated with defining category membership. The semantic content
of a statement is not sufficient for classifying a statement into particular
categories. For example, action statements are included in more than one
category. Therefore it is not surprising that children reordered some of the
story statements.
The more striking finding is that children often inverted affective
statements or cognitions with preceding action statements as if they were
inferring that a "because" relation connected the two statements. For
example, in Table 1 many children ordered statements 9, 10, 11, and 12, by
placing statement 10 after statement 12 so that the constructed order read:
Suddenly Albert was pul led through the water into a boat.
Albert felt sad.
He wished he had been more careful.
He had been caught by a fisherman.
The inversion of internal response or reaction statements with action
statements may indicate that children can spontaneously infer a "because"
relation between two statements so yhat inverted statements can be remembered
accurately. In the studies to be presented later in this chapter, it will be
seen that during recall of story material containing this type of inversion,
many children do spontaneously insert a "because" relation in order to recall
the inverted sequence in the presented order.
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Adults' conceptions of "good" stories also have been examined. Stein
and Nezworski (in press) completed a study where adults were instructed to
recall a "good, coherent" story from texts that did not correspond to the
expected sequence. The two types of stories presented were slightly-
disordered stories, where one category of story information was moved to a
new position within the story, and randomly-ordered stories. Recall of these
stories corresponded almost identically to the expected sequence rather than
to the text order presented to subjects.
Mandler (1977) also conducted a study where adults were asked to recall
specific story violations in such a fashion that the stories would be
considered "good" stories. The stimulus materials were constructed by taking
a story with two episodes and interweaving statements from each episode so
that the resulting story contained a text structure which continually
violated the expected sequence of events. She found, like Stein and
Nezworski, that adults recalled the stories by separating the statements into
two coherent episodes that were identical to the expected story sequence.
The evidence from these studies shows a substantial basis for inferring
that the expected story sequence described in the grammar directly
corresponds to an adult's conception of a "good" story. The results from the
Stein and Glenn (1978) study indicate positive support for this conclusion,
especially for older children. However, the variation in reconstruction in
the second grade data remains unexplained. Although many of the second grade
children constructed semantically coherent stories, some of the constructed
stories, if recal led by children and adults, should undergo a greater
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reorganization than stories matching the description of an expected sequence.
Memory demands and the complexity involved in reconstructing a sequence of 12
lines may have accounted for the variability in some of the orders produced
during reconstruction. Young children may not be able to keep track of a
logical sequence of this length. Thus, their strategy may be to chunk the
sequence into smaller units, adhering to a strict logic within each chunk.
Two studies (Stein & Glenn, 1978; Stein & Nezworski, 1978) then examined
second and sixth graders' skill at recalling stories which contained inverted
sequences of information, thereby deviating from the rules specified by a
story schema. Stories containing inversions can be constructed in two ways.
The first method involves simply moving information in one part of the story,
say the consequence in an episode, to another position in the episode,
without changing or adding any new semantic information to the content of a
story. A second method of creating inversions is to change the position of
one category, similar to the first method, but also to add rhetorical
markers, signaling the occurence of an inversion in the episode. For
example, the consequence category in Table 1 could be moved to a position
occurring immediately after the initiating event. When the first method of
creating inversions is used, no rhetorical markers are added. In the second
type of inverted sequence, rhetorical markers would appear after the
consequence category so that the story would read:
One day, Albert was swimming around the pond
when he spotted a big juicy worm on top of the water.
Suddenly, Albert was pul led through the water into a boat.
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He had been caught by a fisherman.
This happened because ...
and so the story continues by relaying the remainder of the information in
the episode, omitting the consequence from its normal position.
The Stein and Glenn (1978) study examined recall of unmarked inverted
stories (not containing rhetorical markers). If the grammar is valid, any
deviation from the expected sequence of events in a story should cause a
reorganization in recall which conforms more to the expected sequence than to
the presented text sequence. Furthermore, the recovery of accurate story
information may be quite difficult when inversions occur in a text, with
recall decreasing significantly when compared to recall of expected story
sequences. This implies that if subjects do expect certain types of logical
sequences in stories, they may become confused when sequences contrary to
expectations occur. As a result of the confusion, they may spend more time
on the confusions and not attend to other parts of the story as well. The
Stein and Glenn (1978) study showed strong support for the reorganizational
prediction and partial.support for the prediction concerning the amount of
accurate information retrieved during recall.
In their study, Stein and Glenn (1978) constructed nine deviations of an
expected story sequence by manipulating the location of three different
categories. Each category was placed in three different positions other than
its normal location within an episode. For example, the initiating event was
placed either one, two, or three locations away from its normal position in
the episode. The resulting stories contained sequences with the initiating
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event occurring after: (1) the internal response, (2) the attempt, or (3)
the consequence. Similar types of story deviations were constructed by
moving the internal response and consequence categories to new positions in a
story.
The data were analyzed by comparing recall from stories conforming to
the expected sequence to recall from story deviations containing temporal
inversions. The results showed that reorganization of the text sequence
occurred in almost all conditions where stories deviated from the expected
sequence. The type of reorganization was specific to both the category moved
and the distance each category was moved from its normal location.
Independent of the type of reorganization occurring during retrieval,
however, recall of the stories conformed more to the expected story sequence
than to the presented text sequence.
The amount of accurate information recalled decreased significantly, in
comparison to groups receiving the expected story sequence, when either the
initiating event or consequence category was placed in a new location.
Figure 1 summarizes the mean proportion of accurate recall found in both the
control and experimental conditions in this study.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The surprising result from this study was that the internal response
category could be placed anywhere in the episode without decreasing the
amount of accurate recall. Thus, there may be more variability in
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positioning this type of information than a strict reading of the grammar
would allow. Another explanation for this finding is that rules for
comprehending inverted internal response information may be acquired at a
fairly early age.
Marked temporal inversions occur so frequently in stories used in school
textbooks that it becomes imperative to examine the effects of these
inversions on story memory and comprehension. Marked inversions, in contrast
to unmarked inversions, provide a signal that a deviation is occurring in the
normal sequence of events. The inclusion of rhetorical markers in a text may
also inhibit the initiation of certain processing strategies and direct the
listener's attention to the more relevant types of transformations that
should be made during the encoding process. For example, if the consequence
is placed in a position at the beginning of an episode, followed by a
rhetorical marker such as: "This happened because...," the listener
immediately becomes aware that the beginning events occurred later in the
story sequence. The presence of markers, then, may facilitate the encoding
of a cohesive representation of the text sequence so that recall does not
decrease when compared to recall of expected sequences.
On the other hand, stories containing inversions, even though well
marked, should place greater demands on working memory. The inverted
information must be "tagged" in some fashion so that it can be held in memory
and retrieved at the appropriate time in order to construct a cohesive
logical sequence. The ability to remember these marked inversions may depend
upon children's familiarity with deviant structures.
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In order to investigate the effects of marked temporal inversions on
recall, Stein and Nezworski (1978) conducted an experiment where the position
of each of three categories (the internal response, consequence, and
reaction) was systematically varied by placing each category in different
locations throughout the story. Six and ten year-old children participated
in this study. The results, appearing in Figure 2, were provocative both
with regard to developmental differences in recall and to the effects of
different category movements on recall.
Insert Figure 2 about here
For fifth grade children, all stories containing marked inversions were
recalled as well as stories containing the expected sequence of events.
Furthermore, three deviations containing marked inversions were recalled
significantly better than the expected story sequence. All of these
inversions included some movement of the internal response or reaction
category. The two movements most effective in increasing recall were those
in which the internal response occurred before the initiating event or after
a character's reaction at the end of the episode. Recall also increased
significantly when the reaction, the last episodic category, occurred before
the character's consequence.
The first grade results, however, indicated a different pattern of
recall. Although some of the story deviations with marked inversions were
recalled as well as stories containing expected sequences, none were recalled
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better than the expected sequence. In fact, the majority of inversions
significantly decreased recall when compared to the recall of expected
sequences. Thus, a significant developmental difference emerged when the
effects of marked inversions on story recall were examined. Younger children
could not remember deviations from the expected sequence as well as older
children.
Younger children may not have acquired a specific set of strategies or
rules necessary to guide them in recovering as much of the original story
content as older children. These children may be more dependent upon the
story following the expected sequence than older children. This explanation
for developmental differences in recall has also been given in a study
completed by Mandler and DeForrest (1977). They argue that younger children
are less familiar with deviant structures, and that their memory is more apt
to decline when they are presented with any type of deviation from the
expected sequence.
If this assertion is true, then the next question to be raised concerns
how children acquire strategies or rules which allow them to maintain a high
level of recall when inversions do occur. A second question concerns the
order in which these rules are acquired. It is clear that younger children
remember some temporal inversions more easily than others. This finding
suggests that some inversions may be more easily represented or may require
fewer transformations during encoding than other inversions. Piaget (1960)
has argued that a definite hierarchy does exist in the acquisition of rules
used to comprehend "because" relationships. His data, simi lar to Stein and
How Children Understand Stories
25
Nezworski's (1978), showed that the first type of "because" relationship
remembered was an action-affective inversion. He then i llustrated that rules
regarding inversions of personal causation events were acquired before rules
for inverting sequences relating to physical causality.
At the present time, there is no conclusive evidence that illustrates a
definite hierarchy of acquisition rules, primarily because there is a lack of
knowledge about children's comprehension and usage of "because."
Furthermore, not enough data has been collected to determine what children's
conceptions of personal and physical causation are. The first necessary step
in investigating this issue is to determine just what events children
perceive as being directly related to one another. The types of semantic
knowledge structures guiding the perception of causal sequences must be
described in detail. Children may comprehend sequences of physical events as
well as personal events, depending upon whether the sequence matches the
prior knowledge structures they have acquired.
The second step in understanding the acquisition of rules for
comprehending "because" relations involves the description of children's
knowledge concerning the functional usage of this relation. It may be
necessary to determine when young children spontaneously use the "because"
relation and what types of information are connected when "because" occurs.
If these issues are investigated systematically, then methods for
constructing training techniques to ensure comprehension can be developed.
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Probability of Accurately Recalling Story Events
Besides regulating the order in which events are expected to occur, a
story schema also specifies the type of information which is expected in a
story sequence. Both of these factors are important in determining the
accuracy of recall. This section will discuss the probability of story
statements occurring in recall. The next section will present studies which
illustrate how structural variation in stories affects recall.
In the Stein and Glenn (1977a) study, when children heard stories in the
normally expected sequence, certain categories of information were always
recalled more frequently than other categories. These findings were
consistent across the four stories presented and across grade conditions.
The most frequently recalled categories were: setting statements introducing
the protagonist, initiating events and consequence statements. The least
frequently recalled statements were: setting statements describing
contextual information, internal responses, and reaction statements.
Attempts were recalled with some frequency but never as often as were the
most salient categories.
The one exception to the low probability of recalling internal response
statements was the salience of the protagonist's major goal. Children in
both first and fifth grades frequently included this information; however,
all other statements in this category were seldomly recalled, especially by
first grade children. A summary of the salience of category recall in the
Stein and Glenn (1977a) study is presented in Figure 3. The pattern of
recall found by Stein and Glenn (1977a) was similar to that demonstrated by
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Insert Figure 3 about here
Mandler and Johnson (1977). Additionally, Mandler and Johnson showed that
although adult recall was better and somewhat different from children's
recall, consistent patterns were found across all age groups.
There are several reasons which might account for the saliency of
individual statements within an episode. Stories are basically concerned
with goal oriented behavior and ideal ly consist of a sequence of statements
directly related to the attainment of the goal. However, statements within
each story category can be connected to other statements by relations other
than the CAUSE relation, i.e., AND, THEN. It is the type of relation
connecting individual category statements and episodes that should determine
the probability of statement recall within an episode. If the relations
among statements are connected by the CAUSE relation and directly related to
the attainment of the protagonist's goal, then story statements have a high
probability of being recalled. Statements connected to one another by a THEN
relationship should decrease in saliency, and statements connected by an AND
relation should be infrequently recalled. Simi lar predictions can be made
about the relative salience of whole episodes in a story.
At the present time, there are no studies which have systematically
investigated the effects of varying the types of logical relations connecting
statements within an episode. However, Glenn (1977) has manipulated the
types of relations connecting episodes, and has shown that stories containing
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episodes connected by the CAUSE relationship are recalled significantly
better than stories containing episodes connected by the THEN relation.
Two other factors may regulate the salience of certain category
information. The first factor concerns the type of integration or
summarization of story information that sometimes occurs. Two or three
statements can be causally related to one another, but the listener will
recall only one statement which is either an integration of the three or a
higher order summary statement from which the three statements could easily
be inferred.
The second factor concerns the semantic redundancy that can occur
between story statements. Although two statements may be causally related to
one another, the information in one statement or one category may be directly
inferred from the information in other story statements. In this situation,
certain story statements become redundant and to recall all of them would
create an unnecessary load on working memory.
One method that increases the salience of specific category information
is the manipulation of the temporal position of statemments not frequently
recalled. The Stein and Nezworski (1978) study showed that certain marked
temporal inversions not only increased general story recall above that of
expected sequences, but also increased the salience of certain category
statements such as the internal response. These types of inversions, while
increasing the probability of recalling certain statements, also have
important implications for the type of inferences made about the content of a
story. An excellent example of this can be seen in a recent study by Austin,
Ruble, and Trabasso (in press).
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Austin et al. have shown that in stories where a positive intent (a
protagonist wants to do something good) is stated before a negative outcome
(the consequence of the protagonist's actions is seen as being bad), young
children will infer that the character's original intentions were negative.
However, when the intentions are moved to the end of the episode, children
will maintain that the character's intentions were good despite the negative
outcome. Austin et al. attribute the change in moral judgments to the fact
that by stating the intention at the end of a story, a recency effect occurs.
They argue that this change in the temporal location of the intention causes
children to integrate and weight the story information differently than when
the intention is placed before the consequence.
The results from the Stein & Nezworski (1978) study also suggest that
this effect may occur. However, an additional hypothesis can be made
concerning this type of temporal inversion. It can be argued that this
inversion may prevent the listener or reader from making an incorrect
inference about a possible change in the protagonist's original intention.
Although stories often explicitly state the intent of a character,
actions which occur after the protagonist's goal statement can often cause
children to make additional inferences about the protagonist's intent in the
story. These inferences may become more salient in determining the types of
moral judgments made about a character. The inclusion of temporal
inversions, especially in connection with intentions, should limit the type
of inferences made, ensuring that very specific inferences about intentions
will be made. The inversion tells the listener that there was no change in
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the protagonist's intentions throughout the story episode. Thus, it is
clearly evident from the Austin et al. study and from our results that
certain temporal inversions can increase recall and salience of specific
statements, in addition to constraining the types of inferences made about
story characters.
A second example of the facilitative function of inverting story
information may be related to many of the flashback sequences occurring in
stories. In some stories, specific obstacles, many of which are life-
threatening to the protagonist, must be avoided or overcome. Often children
are put in a state of suspense too great to tolerate until the end of the
story. Because of children's awareness that the protagonist could suffer
real harm, they may not be able to attend to the remainder of the story
events. However, if the uncertainty is reduced by placing the consequence
near the beginning of the story, the listener is assured of a positive
outcome. This inversion may then enable the child to attend more efficiently
to subsequent story events.
The Effect of Deleted Category Information
As stated in the previous section, a story schema also specifies the
types of information which should occur in the expected story sequence. The
implication derived from this assumption is that stories not containing all
necessary category information will be transformed so that recall, again,
corresponds more to the expected sequence than to the text structure of a
story.
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In order to test this hypothesis, Stein and Glenn (1977b) carried out an
experiment which involved the systematic deletion of each episodic category
from a story. By deleting each category from the text structure of a story,
the importance of that category could be examined in two ways. When
deletions occur, a "gap" is created in the logical sequnce of events. If a
schema is activated to guide listeners or readers in organizing the incoming
story sequence, then they should attempt to fill in the "gap" during recall
by generating new information which perpetuates the logical sequence of
events. If the grammar is valid, the majority of new information should
replace deleted information. In situations where the listeners have
difficu lty discerning the exact nature of 4-m-t-~-,-~ ,++fi-d+cu,,tty
Lsclc•emng-the -exact ..atr-of the missing information or they are unable to
make inferences about the types of events which could have appeared in that
category, the encoding of the story events should be disrupted, thereby
decreasing recall of the remaining story information.
There are certain exceptions to the above predictions. Again, most of
these exceptions concern the internal response and the reaction categories.
As shown by several of the previously cited studies, these two categories are
often deleted from the structure of an episode. Because the internal
response and reaction categories are among the least well recalled
information in an episode, it appears that subjects may have rules which
allow them to delete these two categories from recall without disrupting
recal Il of the remaining story information or without adding new information
to the episode. Again, the information contained in these categories is
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often so apparent from the other events in a story sequence that it becomes
redundant to recall them.
The results from the Stein and Glenn (1977b) experiment showed that when
initiating events, attempts and consequences were deleted from a story, the
number of new statements included in recall significantly increased in
comparison to the control group. Also, a clear majority of the new
information added to recall matched the type of information deleted from the
story. Figure 4 shows the number of new statements added to recall as a
function of the category deleted. Figure 5 shows the type of inferences
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here
occurring when each category was deleted from the story. Thus, the tendency
to create a coherent logical sequence is quite strong when specific types of
information are deleted.
A second finding of importance is that in both grades recall decreased
significantly in comparison to a control group when the initiating event was
deleted from the story. Recall also decreased in the first grade when the
consequence was deleted. The information loss in these conditions may
indicate that childrern had difficulty generating new information that was
congruent with the entire sequence of events in the story. Often children
generated new information that could be connected to specific parts of the
original story, but not to other parts. In order to make the story more
coherent, some children would then transform more of the original story to
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make it conform with the new information they had generatea to fit the
deleted category.
It can be seen that when certain classes of information are deleted from
a story, children will attempt to fill in the missing information, but often
at the cost of not recal ling other story information. Although this study is
only a beginning attempt to investigate the effects of structural variation
of stories on children's memory, the results are important in relation to the
development of inferential thinking in children.
One of the major functions of inferences is to disambiguate certain
types of story information or to resolve apparent contradictions in the
story. Trabasso and his colleagues (Trabasso, Nicholas, Omanson, & Johnson,
1977) have also made a simi lar argument. After making an initial set of
inferences about incoming information, listeners often can integrate this
information into prior world knowledge about stories. In the process of this
integration, listeners may have a feeling of understanding a problem in a new
frame of reference because of the addition of new knowledge to prior
structures.
The presence of ambiguity or contradictions in a text, however, raises
an important question concerning recall and comprehension of stories. While
these factors might increase the number of inferences made about story
events, the amount of accurate information remembered may decrease.
Additionally, there may be important developmental differences in the types
of strategies and prior knowledge structures used during the comprehension
process.
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Adults may not initially encode the maximum amount of story detail
possible when ambiguities or contradictions occur. However, they are
frequently aware that information loss occurs under these conditions, and may
have strategies to overcome this problem. Many adults read a story twice:
once to understand the plot structure and locate the ambiguities; the second
time to locate details that aid in the reduction of ambiguity. At the
present time, the exact process by which ambiguity is comprehended is not
known. Furthermore, it is not known whether young children can perceive
ambiguity in a text and whether they attempt to make inferences about
ambiguous or contradictory information.
In an initial study investigating children's ability to understand
contradiction, Stein (1977) constructed stories containing extremely
discrepant information. Discrepancies were created by describing the
personality characteristics of the protagonist in either a very positive or
very negative light and then varying the attempts and outcomes of the story.
The attempt and outcome were always at odds with the initial character
description. For example, one of the stories describes a fox who is very
mean and who would never think of helping anyone. However, later in the
story, the fox sees a bear who is very weak and looks half starved. The bear
is trying to catch a fish for dinner and is having absolutely no luck in
getting his supper. The fox walks over to the bear and catches the fish for
him and helps him cook it for dinner. The bear is grateful to the fox for
doing so. The explicit plans of the fox and the reason for the change in his
behavior were never included in the story. Therefore, the story contains
incongruent elements.
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Children in first and fifth grade were tested on these stories in two
different ways. In the first task, they were asked to recall the story
exactly as they heard it. In the second task, children were told that there
may have been information which was missing in the story they heard, and they
were to retell the story, adding anything they thought was missing from the
original version.
In the first recall task, a significant number of first grade children
simply deleted the initial description of the fox and recalled only the
actions and the outcome of the story. Even in recalling the story the second
time, there was very little mention of the fox's meanness or lack of desire
to help others. These children simply deleted the parts of the story that
were incongruous. In the fifth grade, however, most children included the
initial description of the fox plus all of the fox's subsequent behavior. In
an effort to maintain logical consistency, some of the fifth graders included
inferences about the fox's reasons for changing his usual pattern of behavior
toward other animals.
During the second recal I, even more of the fifth grade children included
inferences describing the reasons why the fox had changed his mind about
helping the bear. Thus, we can see that children at different age levels
respond differently to the conception of contradiction. First graders almost
always deleted material to remove the contradiction between the description
of the fox's previous behavior and his behavior in the story episode. Even
when these children were asked about the initial description of the fox in
relation to his behavior in the story, many of the first graders did not see
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the necessity of giving an explanation for change in the fox's behavior
pattern.
Several possible explanations could account for these findings. First
grade children may not have understood that there was any real discrepancy
between the initial personality description of the fox and his later
behavior. The child's conception of a fox not helping anyone may be limited
to specific situations and may not apply to the acquisition of food under
starvation conditions. Even though our statement about the fox never helping
anyone was unambiguous, we don't know exactly what conception children have
of helping. Moreover, even if these younger children understood the
contradiction between the previous and later behavior of the fox, they may
not have been able to generate a reason for the change in his behavior.
Therefore, the most efficient method of constructing the sequence of events
would be to delete that information which is not directly related to the
remainder of the story content. From the results of this study, it is
apparent that the child's concept of contradiction must be defined first so
that a more rigorous study of inferential thinking can be completed.
Conclusions
The studies discussed in this paper iIllustrate the usefulness of a story
grammar approach to comprehension and provide support for many of the
predictions derived from the development of a grammar. Children, like
adults, do expect certain types of information to occur in stories. When
stories don't include certain types of information, new information will
frequently be added so that story recall corresponds more to the sequence
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expected in a story than to the presented sequence. Furthermore, in specific
instances, recall decreases when stories don't contain all of the expected
information. This decrease may occur either because of attentional
difficulties during the encoding process, or possibly because of the
inability to generate new information for the purpose of constructing a
semantically cohesive representation of the incoming material.
Similarly, specific types of temporal sequences are expected to occur in
stories. When stories don't correspond to the expected sequence, as in the
case of unmarked story inversions, reorganization of the story sequence
occurs so that recall conforms more to the expected sequence than to the
presented sequence. The inclusion of specific unmarked inversions in a story
also causes recall to decrease in comparison to recall of stories containing
the expected sequence. Thus, a story schema can be seen to exert a powerful
influence on story recall.
Some of the results from the various studies, however, did not support
the predictions derived from the story grammar. Not all five episodic
categories need be included in a text for story information to be recalled in
a form comparable to stories with all of the expected categories. The
internal response and reaction categories could be omitted from the text
sequence without causing significant decreases in recall when compared to
recall of expected story sequences. Furthermore, children did not attempt to
include new information in recall that would fill in the "gap" created by
these deleted categories. It was concluded that a set of deletion rules may
be used When information in these categories is highly redundant with other
story events.
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The semantic content of a story was then shown to play an important role
in determining whether subjects might add new information to fill in gaps
left by deleted category information. If children perceived discrepancies to
exist in a story sequence, categories such as the internal response would
frequently be added to recall to resolve the discrepancies and to
disambiguate the story sequence. The ability to recognize discrepancies and
the child's knowledge of discrepant events were also hypothesized to play an
important role in predicting whether new information would be added to
reca ll.
Some of the results from the temporal ordering studies did not support
the original hypotheses derived from the story grammar. When children were
asked to construct "good" stories from a scrambled set of stimulus materials,
their stories corresponded positively to the proposed sequence of story
events. However, both the internal response and reaction categories were
frequently put in positions other than their normal location in an episode.
When the internal response category was systematically moved throughout the
episode, without marking or signaling its new position, recall did not
decrease in comparison to recall of expected story sequences.
Several reasons were given to explain why this category movement did not
cause a decrease in recall or why, in a spontaneous story construction task,
this type of information was placed in locations other than its normal
position. As indicated in several of the cited studies, the internal
response category is less frequently recalled in comparison to other
categories, even when story texts correspond to the expected sequence.
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Uecause of the redundancy of its content with other story events, placing the
internal response in a new location may not cause any confusion to the
listener or reader. The occurrence of this category in new locations may
simply serve to reconfirm inferences that have already been made from other
statements in a story.
Another explanation for the relative ease of recalling this type of
category inversion may be related to children's ability to spontaneously
infer the appropriate "because" relations between internal responses and
other types of category information. Results from a spontaneous story
construction task showed that when children constructed their own conception
of a "good" story, they often inverted this type of information and appeared
to infer that a "because" relation connected the two statements. These data
indicate that children may begin to acquire rules to encode specific temporal
inversions at a relatively young age.
Marked inverted story sequences had a different effect on story recall
when compared to recall of most unmarked inverted story sequences. This was
especially true for older chldren. Fifth grade children recal led as much
information from stories containing marked inversions as they did from
stories corresponding to the expected sequence. Furthermore, many of the
marked inverted sequences increased the amount of story information
accurately recal led. In contrast, first graders had difficulty with many of
the story deviations containing marked inversions. The difference found
between the two age groups was attributed to older children's greater
familiarity with the occurrence of deviant story structures.
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A child's ability to retain information from stories containing deviant
structures may be due to knowledge about the function of specific linguistic
devices used to indicate the occurrence of a deviant structure, as well as
the acquisition of specific meta-memorial strategies that facilitate the
encoding of information from deviant structures. For example, when a
flashback occurs in a story, the listener or reader must first recognize that
information is being presented in a deviant sequence. In order to do this,
the function of linguistic devices, such as rhetorical markers, must be
understood. The information which has been inverted must then be identified,
"tagged" so that it can be kept in working memory, and retrieved.
One major issue that wasn't discussed in the chapter concerned the order
in which marked story deviations would be recalled. Even though fifth grade
children recalled information from marked inverted sequences as well as
children receiving expected story sequences, the grammar would predict that
recall of inverted sequences should be transformed to conform more to the
expected sequence than to the text sequence. In the analysis of these data,
transformations did occur so that recall often corresponded more to the
expected sequence than to the text sequence. However, certain marked
inversions were recalled in the presented order. Most of these inversions
involved the internal response and reaction categories.
Thus, it is clear from many of the studies that children learn to
comprehend stories with deviant structures and eventually learn to represent
some of these more complex structures with a high degree of accuracy. It is
evident, however, that a clear and consistent explanation of the process of
acquiring rules for representing more complex stories is still lacking.
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In reviewing studies concerned with children's spontaneous generation of
stories (Glenn & Stein, 1978; Stein & Glenn, 1977c), one of the most
consistent findings was that the structural complexity of children's stories
increased dramatical ly with age. Young children, around five years of age,
often produce stories that are simple reactions to ongoing events. They
frequently fail to include evidence of a planful sequence of behavior and
simply describe "script" like sequences that are representative of everyday
habitual patterns. However, as children develop they begin to include
complex goal structures in their stories, social interactions among
characters, and dialogues between characters.
The grammars, as they are now formulated, cannot account for all of the
variation in structures spontaneously generated by children. Specifically,
the current grammars do not describe the types of structures that must be
used to comprehend and produce multiple protagonist stories, nor do the
grammars contain rules for representing dialogue between two characters. The
grammars also fail to indicate the types of changes which occur in story
schemata, as a function of age. Clearly, more developmental research is
needed to specify the changes which do occur. However, studies which
describe the process of change must also be initiated. Although many studies
have described the various stages of development, especially in Piagetian
terminology, few have attempted a detailed study of the process of
developmental change. Only when a description and explanation of the process
of change is offered, can adequate instructional methods be developed.
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Another important issue which must be studied concerns the definition
and measurement of comprehension. The majority of the studies described in
this paper used only recall procedures. While recall is important in terms
of understanding retrieval processes, this procedure cannot adequately
describe all of the story information which may have been encoded by a child.
As an example, the results from the Stein and Glenn (1977a) study showed that
much of the story information not recalled was, in fact, remembered. Both
first and fifth grade children responded with a high degree of accuracy when
probed about the protagonist's internal responses, and yet few recalled this
information. Stein and Nezworski (in press) have also shown that adults
retain some degree of a surface representation of stories violating the
expected sequence and that recall undergoes greater reorganization than
performance on other tasks, such as recognition or reconstruction.
These findings indicate that the underlying representations of stories
are richer in the amount of information and complexity of structure than
those produced at recall. Furthermore, they indicate that there are
important differences between the use of a story schema during encoding and
retrieval. To date, only a few studies have investigated the difference
between encoding and retrieval processes (Anderson, 1977). However, if an
accurate description of comprehension is to be developed, more studies must
be completed.
A more general problem in the study of story comprehension is that the
current grammars lack a detailed description of the specific semantic
knowledge structure used during comprehension. From analyzing recall data
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and from listening to children tell stories (Glenn & Stein, 1978; Stein &
Glenn 1977c), it is evident that certain themes occur in older children's
stories and are never included in stories by younger children. Although all
children might tell stories containing threats to a protagonist's survival,
older children include different types of information. The obstacles
forseen, the types of plans generated to overcome the obstacles, and whether
or not the protagonist succeeds may be a direct function of the age of a
child. The comprehension and production of stories depends upon a child's
conception of personal causation (De Charms, 1968; Loevinger, 1976) and
knowledge about objects, actions, and social situations in general. In order
to understand the process of comprehension in more detail, studies which
investigate children's knowledge about all of these variables must be
initiated.
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Table 1
1. Setting
2. Initiating Event
3. Internal Response
4. Attempt
5. Consequence
6. Reaction
Setting
Initiating Event
Internal Response
Attempt
Consequence
Reaction
Categories Included in a Simple Story
Introduction of the protagonist; can contain information
about physical, social, or temporal context in which the
remainder of the story occurs.
-An action, an internal event, or a natural occurrence
which serves to initiate or to cause a response in the
protagonist.
-An emotion, cognition, or goal of the protagonist.
-An overt action to obtain the protagonist's goal.
SAn event, action, or endstate which marks the attainment
or non-attainment of the protagonist's goal.
An emotion, 'cognition, action or endstate expressing the
protagonist's feelings about his goal attainment or
relating the broader consequential realm of the pro-
tagonist's goal attainment.
I .
{
2.
3.
{
4.
5.
{
6.
7.{
8.
9.
{
10.
11.
{
12.
Example of a Well-formed Story
Once there was a big gray fish named Albert.
He lived in a big icy pond near the edge of a forest.
One day, Albert was swimming around the pond.
Then he spotted a big juicy worm on top of the water.
Albert knew how delicious worms tasted.
He wanted to eat that one for his dinner.
So he swam very close to the worm.
Then he bit into him.
Suddenly, Albert was pulled through the water into a boat.
He had been caught by a fisherman.
Albert felt sad.
He wished he had been more careful.
--- ·.. 1--. - I
- --- - --
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Mean proportion of statements accurately recalled in the
control and experimental conditions when unmarked story deviations were
presented to 2nd and 6th graders. From the Stein and Glenn (1978) study.
Figure 2. Mean proportion of statements accurately recalled in the
control and experimental conditions when marked story deviations were
presented to 1st and 5th graders. From the Stein and Nezworski (1978) study.
Figure 3. Mean proportion of statements recalled from each category
when stories constructed according to the expected sequence were presented to
1st and 5th graders. From the Stein and Glenn (1977a) study.
Figure 4. Proportion and category classification of new statements
added to recall when each one of five categories (initiating event, internal
response, attempt, consequence, reaction) was deleted from the text structure
of a story. These data are combined across 1st and 5th grades. From Stein
and Glenn (1977b).
Figure 5. Number of new statements added to recall when each one of
five categories was deleted from the text structure of stories presented to
1st and 5th graders. From Stein and Glenn (1977b).
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